Syria is trying to step into a new period after conflicts that have continued for more than a decade. In this process, the country's reconstruction and the binding of its social wounds carry great importance not only for Syria's future but also for the future of the region. As the Migration and Diaspora Foundation, with the field observations and analyses we carried out in December 2024, we aimed to present a comprehensive perspective on Syria's reconstruction process. This report, while addressing the fundamental problem areas and opportunities in Syria's reconstruction process, details the role Türkiye can play in this process. Türkiye's historical ties, regional experience, and successes in the field of development form a ground that can provide important contributions to Syria's reconstruction process. The report emphasizes the fact that Turkish–Syrian cooperation can both deepen the relations between the two countries and contribute to ensuring regional stability. In the report, many topics — from the government structure in Damascus to infrastructure projects, from the economic crisis to social reconciliation — are addressed, and concrete recommendations are presented. This study has not only analyzed the current situation but has also put forward the opportunities that could shape Syria's future. The trust the Syrian people feel toward Türkiye and their expectations of support bring with them the responsibility to carry the cooperation between the two countries further. In this context, with the wish that this presented report guides the relevant parties and inspires the development of policies that will contribute to Syria's reconstruction process... Report link: <a title="Syria Field Observation Report" href="https://gocvediaspora.org/public/publish/0/9/suriye-saha-gozlem-raporu-son.pdf" target="_blank">Syria Field Observation Report</a>

Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Türkiye has hosted millions of Syrians. In this report, the demographic characteristics (age, gender, education, employment status) of Syrian migrants under temporary protection status and the post-war return processes are examined with up-to-date data. As of 2024, the education enrollment rate of Syrians in Türkiye has increased, but difficulties in integration continue because of language barriers and social cohesion problems. While participation in education is higher in the younger age groups, this rate is low among adults. The number of migrants in working life and the rates of participation in education are presented supported with visuals. In the report, it is recommended that, for those who prefer to remain in Türkiye, language courses, vocational training programs, and employment opportunities be increased. For those who return to their countries or plan to return, it is emphasized that safe, voluntary, and dignified return processes should be supported through international cooperation. The report aims to be a guide for academics, journalists, and policymakers in order to develop the education policies of migrants who both remain in Türkiye and return to Syria, and to reduce information pollution. Report link: <a href="https://gocvediaspora.org/public/publish/0/8/turkiyeden-suriyeye-gelecegin-insasi-egitim-ra.pdf" target="_blank">Building the Future from Türkiye to Syria: Education Report</a>

The Social Life of Syrian Refugees The presence of Syrian refugees in Türkiye, together with the economic bottleneck in the country and the operations in Northern Syria, has become a serious subject of debate in both the social and political arenas. In such a climate, where Syrians are mostly associated with problems, writing an article that places the social lives of Syrian refugees at its center — addressing what they do in their free time and the problems they encounter in these activities — may at first seem strange; after all, such a study focuses on how Syrians enjoy life and how they "have fun." In this context, one of the questions we must ask ourselves is this: "Do refugees have the right to have fun?" What inspired the study I conducted as part of my doctoral thesis was the rhetoric I increasingly encountered both on social media and in real life regarding Syrian refugees: "while our soldiers are being martyred in Syria, Syrians are enjoying themselves here, smoking hookah on our shores" (DHA, 2016; Erdogan-Ozturk &amp; Isik-Guler, 2020; T24, 2018). Although most of the research I examined contained data indicating that Syrians are subjected to exploitation in working life and to exclusion in social life, the emerging stereotype of the "Syrian smoking hookah on the shore" caught my attention, and I decided to conduct a study on what Syrian refugees do in their free time. It must be that "refugees having fun" is not a phenomenon people are very accustomed to, not only in Türkiye but in the world as well, for we see that studies addressing the leisure activities of migrants are not sufficient (Horolets, 2012; Stodolska, 1998). For example, according to one study, of 3,669 articles published in various journals related to leisure activities, only 12 addressed migration and leisure activities (Hasmi et al., 2014). The existing studies, meanwhile, show that meaningful, purposeful, and enjoyable leisure activities play an important role in the adaptation and integration of refugees into the society to which they have come (Stack &amp; Iwasaki, 2009). Another study showing the importance of the role leisure activities play in integration is the Home Office 2019 Indicators of Integration Framework, developed by the United Kingdom Home Office to monitor the integration process and to put forward effective strategies on the subject. In this Framework, leisure activities are categorized as a fundamental element, unlike the earlier study on which this framework is based (Ndofor-Tah et al., 2019). Attention has been drawn to the positive role leisure activities play in the migrant's learning of the culture of the host country, developing social relations with the native society, learning the language, and increasing their general well-being. Accordingly, leisure activities stand out both as a tool for improving integration and as evidence showing that integration has taken place. In this respect, for the genuine social and cultural integration of Syrian refugees — who have lived in our country for more than a decade and have, for better or worse, integrated into economic life — it is necessary to look at what they do in their free time and at the problems they encounter here. For there are also studies showing that leisure activities lead to discrimination, to ethnic and intercultural tensions, and to conflicts (Stodolska, 2015). In order to fill the gap I mentioned above and to create awareness in this sense, I conducted a study with 48 Syrians from different social classes, the majority of whom live in Istanbul. The study's data consists both of in-depth interviews conducted with the participants and of observations obtained from visits to the participants' homes, their workplaces, and the cafés and restaurants where they socialize. In the interviews conducted, I first asked what the participants understood by leisure activities,<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a> and then what kinds of leisure activities they engaged in both in Syria and in Türkiye. Accordingly, we determined that leisure activities occupy an important place in the lives of Syrian refugees, and that in this sense the participants see themselves as different from Turks. The participants frequently stated that Turkish society leads a work-based life and does not give enough importance to leisure activities. We determined that the leisure activities the participants engaged in in Syria were mostly family-based, and that in this sense activities such as relative visits, picnics, and camping — through which they could spend time together with family and relatives — stood out. In Türkiye, we observed that similar activities continued, but that, especially for participants coming from rural areas, both participation in activities and the diversity in the types of activities engaged in increased. For example, we saw that relative visits became even more important in Türkiye, and that minority psychology and the exclusion they faced were influential in the emergence of this situation. Another striking point is that the Fatih district emerged as an important leisure space for the participants. The presence of Syrian cafés, restaurants, and markets there, the Fatih Mosque, and the conservative demographic of the district created an environment in which Syrians do not feel themselves to be a minority and can socialize comfortably without fear of exclusion. For example, some participants stated that they come here because it reminds them of Syria, and sometimes just to hear people speaking Arabic around them. Therefore, the most frequent answer given to the question "what do you do in your free time" was "we go to Fatih." Fatih is, in a way, a place where they can eat Syrian food, worship together with their fellow believers in the Fatih Mosque, and, when they go out, see people like themselves — in other words, a place where they feel "at home" and "normal." Another important leisure activity for the participants is the events of NGOs; the participants take on various roles in these events both as participants and as volunteers. This becomes an important social channel through which they can come together with both other Syrians and Turks. Finally, we observed that the participants are generally compelled to prefer low-cost leisure activities. For example, activities such as walking in the park, going to the seaside, spending time at home, going to visit relatives, and spending time on social media are preferred. Syrian refugees encounter various constraints in their leisure activities. Naturally, unlike the native society, we observed the existence of constraints stemming from Syrians being refugees. When we categorize these constraints according to the leisure-constraints model developed by Crawford and colleagues (1991) (Crawford et al., 1991), we determined that Syrian refugees are most affected by structural constraints, followed by intrapersonal and interpersonal constraints. To examine them in order, we determined that among the structural constraints, those stemming from legal status, gender norms, and knowledge of the language stood out. For example, because of their legal status, Syrian refugees are subject to a permit process to go outside the provinces in which they are registered; this situation restricts their freedom to travel for reasons such as touring or vacation. For instance, one participant recounted an incident in which they were stopped by a police officer and asked the reason for their travel; when they answered that it was to have fun, they said the police officer responded as follows: "No, go home. You don't need to have fun. You are Syrian…" (Zuhair, male, middle class). Similarly, because of their legal status, it is also difficult for them to access the legal labor market, which affects their income and directly affects the time and money they can set aside for leisure activities. Another structural constraint is gender norms. We observed that most Syrian women cannot participate in leisure activities, or can participate less than men, because of gender norms and roles. For example, we witnessed that participants could not go out of the house on their own, that in some cases they suffered violence from their families, and that in some cases they saw marriage as a means of liberation in order to attain their freedom. We observed that some Syrian women, because of neighborhood pressure, spend their free time in districts such as Kadıköy, Beşiktaş, and Taksim, where there are no Syrians. Finally, we saw that, despite the time that has passed, Turkish continues to remain a serious structural constraint. We determined that the lack of language seriously restricts both Syrians' job opportunities and their interaction with Turkish society. When we look at intrapersonal constraints, we see that discrimination stands out as the most important constraint, followed by religiosity and the psychological effects of the war. We determined that most participants cut back on their leisure activities out of fear of being subjected to discrimination, and that, out of fear of experiencing trouble, they avoid situations in which they might interact with people. The participants stated that they are greatly affected by the "looks" they are subjected to, especially in public spaces. For example, one father stated that he avoids taking his children to the park because he has to use public transportation and people "look" at him there. In another example, a mother who took her child to the park stated that her child was excluded at the park because they were Syrian, and that they therefore stopped going. Some participants, meanwhile, stated that they do not take part in some activities for religious reasons. For example, there were participants who stated that they do not go to the cinema both because it is mixed men and women and because of obscene scenes. Similarly, we observed that secular participants do not prefer the spaces where conservatives and Syrians have fun. Finally, the psychological effects of the war also lead some participants to withdraw from social life, or to not enjoy these activities even if they do participate in them. Traumas such as the breakup of families and the death of some family and relative members in the war, and the fact that their future remains uncertain despite the decade that has passed, cause them not to enjoy most activities. When we look at interpersonal constraints, we see that the lack of neighbors, family, relatives, and a partner stands out. Our participants stated that the neighbor, family, and relative visits that were very important to them in their lives in Syria weakened in their lives in Türkiye, that neighborly relations are weak in Türkiye, and that their neighbors do not want to associate with them. Most participants stated that their relations with Turks have decreased to the point of nonexistence, that they want to be friends with them, but that after the negative reactions they encountered they have given up hope of this. This situation leads Syrians to turn, for socializing, to fellow Syrians like themselves rather than to the native people, and therefore to concentrate in the same apartment buildings and neighborhoods. This situation will, in the long run, give rise to ghettoization and the formation of two parallel societies. In the study, we determined that these constraints are not experienced to the same degree by every participant, and that there are factors such as social class, legal status, and gender that affect this. In the comparative analyses I made, we saw that the participants' social class in Syria seriously determined their life opportunities in Türkiye. We observed that persons in the high-income group or with a high education level did not encounter most of the problems faced by persons from the lower-income group, or were not affected to the same degree. Therefore, just as there are Syrians who can obtain citizenship, live in secure residential complexes, go to their destinations in their own private cars, regularly travel abroad, and know a foreign language, there are also Syrians who live in basement floors, are subjected to racism every day, and are exploited in working life. In this context, without disregarding either the positive role of leisure activities in integration or the dimension in which social tensions may be ignited, Türkiye needs to develop a serious leisure-management policy for migrants and refugees. Dr. Emrah YAĞMURLU Migration and Diaspora Foundation To browse the author's other articles, <a href="https://gocvediaspora.org/haber?category=emrahyagmurlu" target="_blank">click here</a>. Bibliography Crawford, D. W., Jackson, E. L., &amp; Godbey, G. (1991). A hierarchical model of leisure constraints. Leisure Sciences, 13(4), 309–320. DHA. (2016, August 19). Suriyelilerin “nargileli” deniz keyfi. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yerel-haberler/mersin/suriyelilerin-nargileli-deniz-keyfi-40201160 Erdogan-Ozturk, Y., &amp; Isik-Guler, H. (2020). Discourses of exclusion on Twitter in the Turkish Context:# ülkemdesuriyeliistemiyorum (# idontwantsyriansinmycountry). Discourse, Context &amp; Media, 36, 100400. Hasmi, H. M., Gross, M. J., &amp; Scott-Young, C. M. (2014). Leisure and settlement distress: The case of South Australian migrants. Annals of Leisure Research, 17(4), 377–397. https://doi.org/10.1080/11745398.2014.948023 Horolets, A. (2012). Migrants’ leisure and integration. Polskie Forum Migracyjne II” Institute of Public Affairs Report, 27. Ndofor-Tah, C., Strang, A., Phillimore, J., Morrice, L., Michael, L., Wood, P., &amp; Simmons, J. (2019). Indicators of integration framework 2019. OGL: Home Office Migration and Border Analysis Unit. Stack, J. A., &amp; Iwasaki, Y. (2009). The role of leisure pursuits in adaptation processes among Afghan refugees who have immigrated to Winnipeg, Canada. Leisure Studies, 28(3), 239–259. Stodolska, M. (1998). Assimilation and leisure constraints: Dynamics of constraints on leisure in immigrant populations. Journal of Leisure Research, 30(4), 521–551. Stodolska, M. (2015). Leisure, ethnicity, race and migrations. In World Leisure Journal (Vol. 57, Issue 3, pp. 168–172). Taylor &amp; Francis. T24. (2018). Sahilde nargile içen Suriyelilere tepki gösterdi: Neden ülkenizde savaşmıyorsunuz? T24. https://t24.com.tr/video/sahilde-nargile-icen-suriyelilere-tepki-gosterdi-neden-ulkenizde-savasmiyorsunuz,14843 <a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> Although the concept is translated into Turkish as "boş zaman aktiviteleri" (free-time activities), this is an activity-based definition and does not fully express the concept of "leisure." Leisure does not express only free time and activities; it also encompasses an emotion.

GERMANY'S MIGRATION SPIRAL: A General Overview of German Migration Policy Germany is a country of immigration.<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a> Although reaching this conclusion took a significant amount of time for the state in question, Germany has without doubt been a country of immigration for a very long time. When the developments that have occurred especially since the Second World War are listed one after another, this matter will have no choice but to arrive at the truth. In the historical flow, it is seen that Germany responded to various migration flows in different ways and developed a policy in a certain direction.<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">[2]</a> The course of the historical development of the migration policies of Germany — which has seen the peaks of migration mobility among EU countries — developed in parallel with the political concerns of the state in question. Whether it will be said that Germany, which initially had a migration approach along a national/racial line, moved away from this idea as it approached the present day, or rather developed and reinforced it, will at a certain point remain a mystery. In short, German politics, through the practical solutions it has developed for migrants and the phenomenon of migration, reveals the picture of an ideology. It is possible to provide a top-down view of German migration politics by setting out from some practical examples. In a more detailed and in-depth study, it is more likely that the background of these policies can be seen. MIGRATION IN HISTORY AND GERMAN POLICIES It is useful to state at the outset that Germany has been tested at 3 important points throughout history with the phenomenon of migration: the pre-unification period, the period from the Second World War to the Oil Crisis, the period from the Oil Crisis to the unification of the German blocs, and the present day.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">[3]</a> Throughout this entire historical process, the migration movement was sought to be kept under control, and the state was, as it were, sought to be protected from the harms of migration. It is quite explanatory to express this protectionist view, in its common usage, in the form of "Secure Borders, Safe Haven." It is also inevitable to say that this point of view is a policy that the entire world has embraced in the face of migration — perhaps not openly, but conducted covertly.<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4">[4]</a> Indeed, especially when German politics is examined closely, the belief that the paradise state passes through secure borders occupies quite a large place. In the post-Second-World-War period, in which 12 million ethnic Germans were forced to migrate, those who were persecuted became acquainted with the right of asylum in 1949 through the Grundgesetz.<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5">[5]</a> As a result of the developments here, those who were ethnically German were able to return to their own country. This both lays bare Germany's nationalist politics and reveals that population growth could not be achieved at the desired level in this period. It is precisely at this point that, together with the labor agreements, the story of the Turks — who comprise a serious portion among Germany's migrants — begins.<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6">[6]</a> Again, in order to explain Germany's protective migration policy with examples, it is useful to give place to the following matter: Germany closed off the path of the dual-citizenship practice for migrants of Turkish origin, made citizenship transitions subject to difficult conditions, and gave place to practices that damage human dignity, such as the "Conscience Test."<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7">[7]</a> What is understood from this is that a person of Turkish origin, in order to obtain German citizenship, must — in addition to fully and completely embracing German culture — so strip away their migrant status that they must sever their ties with the country of nationality from which they migrated here. As is accepted in international law, it is a fact that the state has absolute authority on a matter such as citizenship. But in order to shed a little more light on this matter, Germany's practices toward migrants in, for example, the labor market may be touched upon. Germany, as a whole, implements a graduated practice toward migrants. In working life as well, this situation confronts us in the same way. For Germans and "privileged foreigners with a special work permit provided by the state," hardly any problem can be spoken of in terms of the work permit and the conditions of working life. But on the other side, the possession of even a work permit, especially by citizens of third-world countries, has been made subject to quite detailed conditions. In the end, the work permit provided is also limited and time-bound. So much so that it can even be determined that a person from a third-world nation's entry into any job depends on the absence there of the Germans and privileged foreigners just mentioned.<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8">[8]</a> Such compelling conditions go as far as migrants falling behind in economic, psychological, and educational terms and striving to attain success by different means. In a system in which integration efforts have fallen behind and their place has been taken by compelling, restrictive migration policies, it will be inevitable for migrants to fall into a disadvantaged status. Even today, so-called protective foreigner policies have played a role in bringing Turks, or Pakistanis in a similar position, to this point in Germany. On the other hand, it is useful to note that Germany is also a country that possesses serious developments in integration efforts. When we leave aside for a moment the negative matters we mentioned above — and if we also do not count the period in which, by being called "guest workers," even their permanence was not accepted and for this reason no work was done — Germany expanded its integration efforts the moment it noticed the migrants' effort to build a life. For example, with the National Integration Plan that was created, a serious concentration occurred on work, education and instruction, employment, and cultural integration.<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9">[9]</a> The German Government, which organized courses within this scope, spread these courses throughout the country and made them compulsory. Certain particular matters are included in the integration courses in question. The most important of these are, of course, the teaching of German values and culture and the raising of migrants' knowledge of the German language to a certain level.<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10">[10]</a> Especially migrants who are certain to stay in Germany for more than a certain period are expected to know German at a good level. Although all these efforts appear to some of the migrants as an "assimilation effort," it stands to be made sense of that such a nationalist government in particular would enter into such an endeavor. Thus, the middle point of the Germans living in Germany and the privileged foreigners living together with the so-called migrants coming from third-world nations was sought. Germany stands before us as a state that has built a serious and complex law/policy of foreigners in this cause, continuing to be constantly tested by the matter of migration. But the seriousness and difficulty of the matter of migration is also a matter that truly is not to be taken lightly. According to Michael Walzer, the domination of citizens over non-citizens and foreigners is probably the most barbaric form of despotism in the history of humanity.<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11">[11]</a> Germany, too, has developed a reflex similar to that of many European countries against these matters and has responded in two ways: 1) Building strict control and selection mechanisms for migrants at entries into the countries through policing and security measures; (2) Differentiating and stratifying rights toward migrants through laws.<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12">[12]</a> The first sentence of the first article of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) begins with "Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar.": Human dignity is inviolable. It is ordinary and to be expected that a law that sets out to build legislation with such a beginning would, while making a distinction (?) of foreigner – migrant – citizen, recall at every opportunity the human dignity it holds at the highest rank. Att. Emrehan Parlak Migration and Diaspora Foundation To browse the author's other articles, <a href="https://gocvediaspora.org/haber?category=EmrehanParlak" target="_blank">click here</a>. Bibliography Altan, Hale Nur, ve Muhammet Musa Budak. "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Almanya Göç Politikalarının Dönüşümü." Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences 22, no. 4 (2023): 1409–1423. Güllüpınar, Fuat. "Almanya’da Göçmen Politikaları ve Türkiyeli Göçmenlerin Trajedisi: Yurttaşlık, Haklar ve Eşitsizlikler Üzerine." Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 14, no. 1 (2014): 1–16. Morris, Lydia. "New Labour's Community of Rights: Welfare, Immigration and Asylum." Journal of Social Policy 36, no. 1 (2007): 39–57. Sachverständigenrat für Integration und Migration (SVR) gGmbH. Migration und Integration: Entwicklungen von 2019–2024. Zahlen und Fakten zum SVR-Jahresgutachten 2024. Berlin: Neue Promenade 6, 10178, 2024. <a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> Sachverständigenrat für Integration und Migration (SVR) gGmbH. Migration und Integration: Entwicklungen von 2019–2024. Zahlen und Fakten zum SVR-Jahresgutachten 2024. Berlin: Neue Promenade 6, 10178, 2024. S.1 <a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a> Altan, Hale Nur, ve Muhammet Musa Budak. "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Almanya Göç Politikalarının Dönüşümü." Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences 22, no. 4 (2023): 1411 <a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a> Altan, Hale Nur, ve Muhammet Musa Budak. "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Almanya Göç Politikalarının Dönüşümü." Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences 22, no. 4 (2023): 1411 <a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a> Güllüpınar, Fuat. "Almanya’da Göçmen Politikaları ve Türkiyeli Göçmenlerin Trajedisi: Yurttaşlık, Haklar ve Eşitsizlikler Üzerine." Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 14, no. 1 (2014): 1 <a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a> Altan, Hale Nur, ve Muhammet Musa Budak. "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Almanya Göç Politikalarının Dönüşümü." Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences 22, no. 4 (2023): 1412 <a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6">[6]</a> Sachverständigenrat für Integration und Migration (SVR) gGmbH. Migration und Integration: Entwicklungen von 2019–2024. Zahlen und Fakten zum SVR-Jahresgutachten 2024. Berlin: Neue Promenade 6, 10178, 2024. <a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7">[7]</a> Güllüpınar, Fuat. "Almanya’da Göçmen Politikaları ve Türkiyeli Göçmenlerin Trajedisi: Yurttaşlık, Haklar ve Eşitsizlikler Üzerine." Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 14, no. 1 (2014): 7 <a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8">[8]</a> Güllüpınar, Fuat. "Almanya’da Göçmen Politikaları ve Türkiyeli Göçmenlerin Trajedisi: Yurttaşlık, Haklar ve Eşitsizlikler Üzerine." Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 14, no. 1 (2014): 9 <a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9">[9]</a> Altan, Hale Nur, ve Muhammet Musa Budak. "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Almanya Göç Politikalarının Dönüşümü." Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences 22, no. 4 (2023): 1415 <a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10">[10]</a> Altan, Hale Nur, ve Muhammet Musa Budak. "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Almanya Göç Politikalarının Dönüşümü." Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences 22, no. 4 (2023): 1416 <a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11">[11]</a> Morris, Lydia. "New Labour's Community of Rights: Welfare, Immigration and Asylum." Journal of Social Policy 36, no. 1 (2007): 39–57. <a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12">[12]</a> Güllüpınar, Fuat. "Almanya’da Göçmen Politikaları ve Türkiyeli Göçmenlerin Trajedisi: Yurttaşlık, Haklar ve Eşitsizlikler Üzerine." Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 14, no. 1 (2014): 3

The Development of Germany's Migrant Policy and Its Future Perspective In the process of transition to postmodern international relations, following the end of the bipolar world, the integration of the investments made in the field of military technology during the Cold War period into the transportation, information technology, and communication sectors led to the blurring of borders between nation-states and to an increase in intercontinental population mobility. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the negative aspects of East Germany's failed statist development policy also affected the perspective on migrants. Germany, which rebuilt the state system from the bottom up within a single piece of territory, began to define migrants — the most important element of demography — not in the status of guest workers but as one of the essential elements of the social structure. Within this framework, the transformation, during the formation process of citizenship policies, of the definition of the "ethnic nation" (Volksnation) through a birth-based citizenship policy for all those born within Germany's borders after the year 2000 enabled the "ethnic German" model to gain legitimacy through a more comprehensive sociological definition. In this direction, the meeting of the labor-force need — the most important factor for the state structure reorganizing itself — through migrants, as a result of the instrumentalization of social-cohesion definitions, came, with the effect of globalization policies as well, to the position of being the main agenda item of German politics and sociology.<a href="#_edn1" name="_ednref1">[i]</a> The application process, on the sociological plane, of the policies developed within the framework of social cohesion led to subculture conflicts because of the goal of rapidly integrating many different cultures. The reinterpretation of the conflicts experienced at the subculture level, especially from the perspective of historicity, and their inclusion in the propaganda process revealed the cultural void of the cohesion policies. After this point, German governments, in line with the strategy of uniting the migrant children born in Germany under a single German cultural and social identity, gave integration a new perspective in 2004 with the concept of cultural citizenship.<a href="#_edn2" name="_ednref2">[ii]</a> The preference for the policy of keeping regional/local actors in conflict instead of hot conflicts — as a result of nuclear armament evolving day by day to a dimension that would destroy nation-states — also partially ensured the sustainability of the global economic system. However, the considerable difficulty of controlling population mobility, with the effect of globalization and the blurring of nation-state borders as well, led to many changes in the national security strategies and societal control mechanisms of continental European states. The mass migrant and refugee mobility produced by the Syrian Civil War — the most destructive phase of the Arab Spring — triggered Germany's development of a new strategy in 2015 under the name of the "welcome culture" (Willkommenskultur) project. Especially after 2015, Germany, which has an aged population totaling 23 million, has, as a result of the decline in its rate of population growth as well, come to the position of a global migration destination.<a href="#_edn3" name="_ednref3">[iii]</a> Simultaneously, it has also been striking that far-right movements and Neo-Nazism gained strength as a result of the regional conflicts in the Middle East and between Russia and Ukraine raising energy costs, and of China leaving Germany behind in the rate of increase of industrial production, thereby weakening the German economy. The fact that the anti-migrant rhetoric with which far-right parties such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD) found significant support in public opinion gained legitimacy in the latest state elections has revealed the necessity for the German government to give a new perspective to the goal of its migrant policy meeting the labor-force need and of its development model succeeding. In this sense, the National Action Plan for Tolerance and Democracy (Nationale Aktionsplan für Toleranz und Demokratie), which the German government re-implemented in 2018 by broadening its framework, has emerged as an important concrete step that places democratic values at the center and gives a new model to the integration of German society and migrants. As a first concrete step, as a result of the new legal reform put into effect in June 2023 under the leadership of German Interior Minister Nancy Faeser, the access of persons residing in Germany for a long time to obtaining a German work permit and German citizenship was increased. The motivation produced by the reduction of the residence-period requirement from eight years to five — and its further shortening through a high-level cohesion condition — will inevitably affect the increase of migrants' power in German sociology and, in subsequent periods, in German politics. In addition, with the recognition of the right to dual citizenship as well, it is aimed that the German economy will regain the power to meet demand, from the perspective of industrial development, which the Chinese economy holds in its hands. It is inevitable that the thought and strategy that the ethnocentric conflicts experienced at the subculture level will also be weakened by the acquisition of citizenship will be at the center of the German government's policy-formation process in the coming period as well. However, alongside the goal of the German economy's rapid development strategy and the strengthening of cultural-sociological integration, the facilitation of obtaining a work permit and the right to citizenship is also expected to strengthen, under the leadership of the AfD, far-right, chauvinist, and nationalist formations within German society. Especially in parallel with the rise of the far right in society, the fact that the migrant class that obtains citizenship has the potential to form parallel societies (Parallelgesellschaften) instead of integrating with German society also makes it quite likely that significant threats to the fundamental rights and freedoms of migrant communities in Germany will arise.<a href="#_edn4" name="_ednref4">[iv]</a> The report published in Die Welt in 2021 reveals that migrants are reluctant to participate in German-language courses and integration programs and try to continue their processes of participating in society within their own cultural regions. With the Israel-Palestine crisis — which began on 7 October 2023 and produced significant cracks in the global political system — also being carried over to Europe, the additional possibility of the formation of new parallel societies (Parallelgesellschaften) being strengthened in Germany shows that the German government will, in the coming period, give more weight to policies aimed at preserving social cohesion and integration. Muhammed Enes Danalıoğlu Migration and Diaspora Foundation <a href="#_ednref1" name="_edn1">[i]</a> Triadafilopoulos, Triadafilos, and Karen Schönwälder. “How the Federal Republic Became an Immigration Country: Norms, Politics and the Failure of West Germany’s Guest Worker System.” German Politics &amp; Society, vol. 24, no. 3 (80), 2006, pp.12 JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23742736. Accessed 7 Nov. 2024. <a href="#_ednref2" name="_edn2">[ii]</a> Münz, Rainer and Ralf E. Ulrich. “Immigration and Citizenship in Germany.” German Politics and Society 17 (1999): pp.5 <a href="#_ednref3" name="_edn3">[iii]</a> Laubenthal, B. (2019). Refugees Welcome? Reforms of German Asylum Policies Between 2013 and 2017 and Germany’s Transformation into an Immigration Country. German Politics, 28, pp.418 <a href="#_ednref4" name="_edn4">[iv]</a> <a href="https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/plus243782209/Berlin-Wie-Parallelgesellschaften-die-Hauptstadt-zerfleddern.html">https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/plus243782209/Berlin-Wie-Parallelgesellschaften-die-Hauptstadt-zerfleddern.html</a> (Last Accessed: 7 November 2024) To browse the author's other articles, <a href="https://gocvediaspora.org/haber?category=menesdanalioglu" target="_blank">click here</a>.

READING MIGRANTS THROUGH THE LENS OF DIASPORA Migration is a phenomenon to which every era and geography has repeatedly borne witness throughout the history of humanity. People who strive to take hold of life in a new place, leaving behind the homeland in which they were born and raised for different reasons such as war, famine, education, economic necessity, and so on, are defined as migrants. Individuals and communities who, while also preserving their ties with their own homeland, strive to strengthen their bond with their homeland through the means and power they have where they are located, are defined as a diaspora. According to the data of the United Nations (UN) International Organization for Migration (IOM), the migrant presence in the world reached 281 million as of 2022 and constitutes 3.6% of the world's population. According to research conducted in 152 countries between 2015 and 2017 by the U.S.-based research company Gallup, it is seen that 750 million people in the world would like to migrate to another country if they found an opportunity. According to the study, 160 million people want to migrate to the United States, 47 million to Canada, 42 million to Germany, and 6 million to Türkiye. According to the same company's research conducted in 122 countries in 2021, the proportion of those who would like to migrate to another country if they could find the opportunity rose to 16% of the adult population (approximately 900 million). This picture shows that the migrant presence in the world is now a reality that must be accepted by the entire world, and that migrant mobility will continue in the period ahead. Throughout history, the migrant presence has, for every country, contained problems and threats on the one hand, and power and opportunities on the other. Every rising civilization has risen by focusing on the power and opportunities of the migrant presence and evaluating that presence on the path toward a shared future. The Seljuk, Ottoman, and U.S. experiences are the first examples that come to mind on this subject. For Türkiye to view and evaluate the migrant presence it possesses through the lens of diaspora, and to benefit from this presence's power in the economic, commercial, political, and diplomatic spheres, is a highly important opportunity on Türkiye's path to becoming a global power. For a long time in Türkiye, the phenomenon of diaspora was a concept heard around the lobbying power of the Jewish diaspora in the United States and the lobbying activities the Armenian diaspora carried out against Türkiye in Europe and the United States. Recently, however, studies concerning especially the Turkish Diaspora in Europe have given this concept a new meaning and footing. In the period after the Arab Spring, Türkiye came face to face with intense migrant mobility coming from the countries of the region. Among the newly arriving migrant groups, many politicians, academics, opinion leaders, and business people from many different countries have now begun to live in Türkiye and carry out their work concerning their own homelands on a Türkiye-centered basis. These diaspora groups, which carry out activities in many fields such as humanitarian aid, education, strategy, and the production of ideas through the civil society organizations they have established in Türkiye, have emerged as a new experience for the Republic of Türkiye. When human communities are seen through the definition of "migrant," they are evaluated through crises and risks, and the education problem, the language problem, settlement problems, and demographic threats become the first agenda items that come to mind. When you begin to evaluate the same human communities as a diaspora, however, the focus turns to a different point of evaluation through power and opportunities, and subjects such as economic power, a commercial relationship network, the opportunity for diplomacy, and the opportunities of international relations come to the fore. Türkiye has discussed the migrant presence it has faced especially over the last 13 years within the framework of the concept of "migration" and has built its current policies on the crises and threat perceptions experienced on that plane. Türkiye has, on the one hand, become a center of attraction as a power whose appeal is rising for the entire world, with embassies whose number increases day by day in every region of the world, and with the activities of the Yunus Emre Institute, the YTB, TİKA, and the Maarif Foundation. The benefit to Türkiye of the increasing International Student presence, regular migrant mobility, and rising tourist numbers brought about by all these policies could not be explained to a society that has experienced economic difficulties in recent years; and a constructed migrant hostility built on false information first took society, then the bureaucracy and politics, and finally the academic world under its influence. The reality of the migration issue in Türkiye has now become impossible to discuss, and a point has been reached where policy is produced by ignoring the harm that every foreigner who leaves or is sent away from Türkiye will cause to our country at home and abroad. Through these policies aimed at reducing the foreign presence and foreign mobility within the country, life in Türkiye has been made step by step more difficult for every kind of migrant group. This situation has also affected the skilled migrant groups in Türkiye who came from various countries — International Students, business people, politicians, scientists — and hundreds of thousands of people have chosen to leave Türkiye and go to different countries. In order to reach its goals on the path to becoming a global power, Türkiye must possess a strong economy, qualified human resources, and a very diverse and widespread relationship network. When the countries that are its rivals on this matter are examined, it is seen that they evaluate human and economic assets across the entire world and build their relationship networks throughout the world, as if competing with one another, in order to benefit more from these assets. It is not possible for any country that wishes to become a global power to achieve this in a manner closed to the outside and by benefiting only from its own resources. It is possible to see this both in the examples of civilizations that rose in history and in the powers rising in the competitive environment of today's world. Türkiye must redirect its domestic political ground toward its goals on the path of once again becoming a global power, and must build both its domestic and foreign policy in harmony on this plane. In this context, our migration policy too must be re-evaluated so as to build a method that will increase Türkiye's economic power and skilled manpower, and it must be borne in mind that the restrictive migration policies pursued as a product of domestic politics, through global communication instruments, harm our relationship network throughout the world. It must not be forgotten that every migrant whom we do not want in Türkiye and whom we strive to make leave is the relative, neighbor, friend, kinsman, or fellow townsman of our allies standing beside our diplomats at the table — those who fight against terror together with our soldiers in Syria and Libya, or in Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, Astana, Afghanistan, and all kinds of crisis regions. Therefore, whoever mistreats, ostracizes, humiliates, insults, or disregards a migrant or any foreigner in Türkiye is in fact, knowingly or unknowingly, serving those who wish to deprive Türkiye of the economic asset from which it benefits; is harming the ties with Türkiye of the skilled human resources from which Türkiye might benefit; and is preparing the ground for the deterioration of the relationship between us and our allies in different geographies. As the Migration and Diaspora Foundation, we invite all of Türkiye — from the bureaucracy to politics, from academia to every individual on the street — to read migrants through the lens of diaspora. Because only then will we begin to see the benefits these people, who prefer Türkiye over many countries in the world and wish to live here with us, provide to our country; and we will be able to find the opportunity to evaluate the power and opportunities they will provide on our journey of becoming a global power. In this direction, as also emphasized in the "Türkiye Migration Mobility (2016–2023)" report prepared by our Foundation, by moving the asylum-seeker presence in Türkiye to a status in which they can foresee their future, and especially by opening the way for a migrant status through which the young generation born, raised, and educated in Türkiye can, when they reach the age of production, contribute to this country's growth and see their own future together with the future of this country, we will have removed one of the most important obstacles before our benefiting from these powers and opportunities. Recep Seyyar Migration and Diaspora Foundation Chairman of the Board of Directors To browse the author's other articles, <a href="https://gocvediaspora.org/haber?category=recepseyyar" target="_blank">click here</a>.